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The first military coup d’état in the South Pacific occurred on the 108th 
anniversary of the first arrival in Fiji of Indian indentured labourers.1 At 10am 
on Thursday, 14th May 1987, a group of ten soldiers in combat gear armed with 
M16 assault rifles and led by an indigenous Fijian soldier in a suit stormed into 
the Fijian parliament, taking members of the month‑old, democratically‑elected 
government hostage.2 Three more coups have taken place since and each was 
followed by an economic collapse, a spike in poverty, and an exodus of Indo‑Fijians 
from the nation of their birth. 
The coup of 1987 was rationalised as a return of political control to the indi‑
genous population as the newly‑elected government was purported by the per‑
petrators as being dominated by those of Indian heritage.3 However, on the 
day of the coup the most senior positions in government, including those of 
the Governor General, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of Parliament, and the 
Leader of Opposition, were all held by indigenous Fijians.4 If Indo‑Fijians were 
not, in fact, dominating the government, what were the reasons for the coup? 
Indigenous Fijian paramountcy, according to one author, was an excuse as 
the same “propaganda [was] used by European and Fijian chiefs for their own 
political purposes in the colonial era”.5 Sutherland attributes the coup to a class 
1 Victor Lal, Fiji, Coups in Paradise: Race, Politics and Military Intervention (London, Atlantic 
Heights New Jersey: Zed Books, 1990), 192–221. 
2 Robert Robertson and Akosita Tamanisau, Fiji: shattered coups (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1988), 
59–84.
3 John Sharpham, Rabuka of Fiji: The Authorised Biography of Major‑General Sitiveni Rabuka 
(Australia: Central Queensland University Press, 2000), 88–102.
4 Satendra Nandan, Requiem for a rainbow: a Fijian Indian story (Canberra: Pacific Indian 
Publications, 2001), 25. 
5 Stephanie Lawson, The failure of democratic politics in Fiji, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990), 261.
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struggle between chiefs, tribes, eastern and western indigenous Fijians, and 
urban and rural folk.6 
This paper argues that there were two main contributing factors to the 
political strife in postcolonial Fiji and both the result of colonisation a century 
ago: first, the exclusionary political institutions of which the chiefs from eastern 
Fiji were the main beneficiaries; and, second, the extractive economic institutions 
of which indentured labourers were the main victims. Independent Fiji in the 
lead‑up to the first coup was governed by descendants of the privileged chiefs 
who, for the first time, had lost power in the national elections of April 1987 
to a coalition comprising the Fiji Labour Party, which had its roots in the trade 
unions, and the National Federation Party with its majority Indo‑Fijian support: 
the coup restored power to the displaced chiefs.7 
This paper examines some of the main causes of the plight (and poverty) of 
contemporary Fiji: elitist politics; the role of indentured labour; the contribution 
of the global sugar industry; and the politics of rent extraction. It links two 
strands of the extant literature: the first on the forms of social organisation dating 
back to the mid‑twentieth century8; and the second to the recent literature on 
settler versus extractive colonies and the contributions of institutions versus 
endowments to the observed differences in developmental outcomes across 
nations.9 There is an emerging consensus that ‘institutions rule’ and this ‘trumps 
geography and international trade’ in explaining the differences in the levels of 
development across nations.10 Colonial history has been used as an explanation 
for the form of institutions implanted: places chosen for permanent settlement, 
such as Australia, benefited from inclusive political and economic institutions 
that were conducive to growth in income and mass participation in politics, 
while others that were occupied for extraction of resources had the opposite 
experience.11 In the Fijian case, power and wealth was distributed inequitably at 
the early stages of colonisation, which has had an enduring effect on political and 
economic freedom.
The coups in Fiji, in sum, are the product of a splintering of a system weighed 
down on the one end by elitist politics and on the other by the demands of a modern 
6 William Sutherland, Beyond the Politics of Race: an alternative history of Fiji to 1992 (Canberra: 
Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National 
University, 1992), 129ff.
7 Ibidem, 181.
8 Sidney Mintz, “The Culture History of a Puerto Rican Sugar Cane Plantation: 1876–1949”, 
The Hispanic American Historical Review, 33 (1953): 224–251.
9 David Acemoglu, “Root causes”, Finance & Development 40 (2003): 27–43.
10 Cf. Dani. Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi, Institutions rule: the primacy of 
institutions over geography and integration in economic development, (National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge, USA, 2002).
11 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James Robinson, “The colonial origins of comparative 
development: An empirical investigation”, American Economic Review, 91 (2001): 1369–1401.
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democracy. The paternalistic policies put in place at colonisation quarantined the 
indigenous population to their traditional ways of village life12 under the tutelage 
of a hierarchy of chiefs in what is referred to as ‘non‑transformative colonisation’ 
in the literature.13 Rights to un‑alienated land, comprising some 82 percent of 
the total, were vested in the indigenous population, with tribal chiefs given the 
majority share of income arising from the leasing of this land.14 This created 
a highly stratified and unequal indigenous society built on rent‑seeking. The 
indentured workers were relegated to the bottom stratum and were the source 
of rents for the elite. The survival of such a society was put under pressure from 
the demands of a market economy based on universal franchise. The national 
elections of 1987 transferred power from the chiefly elite; but the coup that 
followed suggests that extractive institutions won this round of the struggle. 
Fiji, as explained later, was a typical extractive colony. The institutions 
implanted at colonisation were to serve the interests of the colonialists and the 
chiefs. Chiefs from the east, who had ceded Fiji to Britain, gained most since 
the  rest of the nation was brought into the fold of the new administration 
through  the use of armed force.15 Independence on 10 October 1970 handed 
political power to descendants of the eastern chiefs who took a leaf out of their 
colonial predecessors, supporting a chiefly and merchant elite and cementing 
their position in politics and the economy.16 Fiji is not an exception on this count. 
Institutions in extractive colonies were developed to protect and enrich the 
elite while the rule of law was applied selectively; rights to property were absent 
for many; the elites had disproportionate power in politics and the economy; 
and only the privileged had access to education, credit, and natural resources.17 
Importantly, institutions created at colonisation have persisted so that reforms 
intended for the benefit of the majority have failed to materialise; leaving those 
lumbered with an initial handicap being left further behind in terms of prosperity 
long afterwards. The highly inequitable distribution of rights to land (and power) 
put in place at colonisation impeded political participation and taxed prosperity.18 
12 Atu Bain, “A protective labour policy? An alternative interpretation of early colonial labour 
policy in Fiji” The Journal of Pacific History 23 (1988): 119–136.
13 Lorenzo Veracini, “Emphatically Not a White Man’s Colony”, Journal of Pacific History, 
43 (2008): 189–205.
14 Ralf Ward, Elizabeth Kingdon “Land, law and custom: diverging realities in Fiji”, Land, 
custom and practice in the South Pacific, 1995), 198–249.
15 Cf. Peter France, The charter of the land: custom and colonization in Fiji, (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1969).
16 Stephanie Lawson. The failure of democratic politics in Fiji. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990): 
pages 158–194.
17 Cf. Ross Levine, Law, endowments, and property rights (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau 
of Economic Research, 2005).
18 Kenneth Sokoloff, Stanley Engerman, “History lessons: Institutions, factor endowments, and 
paths of development in the new world”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14 (2000), 217–232.
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People, Power, and the Politics of Race
The coverage here is brief and focussed on the institutions created in the 
lead‑up to colonisation that have since thrived and contributed to rent extraction 
and ethnic politics in postcolonial Fiji. Slavery was abolished in the British 
Empire in 1834, which led to the advent of the indentured labour system whereby 
workers were recruited and shipped from labour‑abundant parts of the British 
Commonwealth to places in demand of their services.19 This experiment began 
with the arrival of 36 labourers onboard the ship Atlas that reached Mauritius on 
3 November 1834 and ended with the landing of 888 immigrants on Sutlej V in Fiji 
on 11 November 1916.20 Furthermore, Indian indentured workers were shipped 
to Guyana (from 1835–1922), Trinidad & Tobago (1851–1917), South Africa 
(1860–1911), and Suriname (1853–1916).21 The first ship‑load of 463 Indian 
indentured workers to Fiji arrived on 14 May 1879. From then to November 
1916, a total of 87 vessels ferried a total of 60,553 Indian indentured workers 
to the colony.22 The workers were posted to work on the sugar plantations with 
the majority being run by the Australian‑owned and operated Colonial Sugar 
Refining Company (CSR). The indentured labour system was abolished in 1916 
following grass roots agitation in India over the maltreatment of the workers, 
which was led by Mahatma Gandhi.23 
The formation of the Fijian state and the import of indentured Indian labour 
to work on sugar plantations owned by CSR set the tone for the subsequent 
development of the economy and politics in Fiji. CSR was established in Australia 
in 1855 and commenced operations in Fiji in 1880, at the encouragement of the 
colonial government, with the purchase of its first sugar mill in Nausori in 1882.24 
The colony needed an economic base and the first governor saw sugar as the 
industry that would achieve it and CSR as the handmaiden. In attracting CSR 
to Fiji, the colonial authorities provided 928 acres of alluvial flat land at a nominal 
price of £2/acre and assistance in the recruitment of labour.25 CSR, for its part, 
19 Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 65–115.
20 Richard Allen, “Capital, illegal slaves, indentured labourers and the creation of a sugar 
plantation economy in Mauritius, 1810–60”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 
36 (2008), 151–170 and Kenneth Gillion, Fiji’s Indian Migrants: a History to the End of Indenture 
in 1920, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1962), 214.
21 Cf. Adrian Mayer, Peasants in the Pacific: a study of Fiji Indian rural society, (Berkley: Univ 
of California Press, 1973) and Kay Saunders, Indentured labour in the British Empire, 1834–1920 
(Australia: Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1984).
22 Gillion, Fiji’s Indian Migrants …, 212–214.
23 Cf. Totaram Sanadhya, My twenty‑one years in the Fiji Islands (Suva: Fiji Museum, 1991).
24 Michael Moynagh, Brown Or White?: A History of the Fiji Sugar Industry, 1873–1973 
(Canberra: Australian National University, 1981), 12–39.
25 Bruce Knapman. “Capitalism’s Economic Impact in Colonial Fiji, 1874–1939: Development 
or Underdevelopment?”, The Journal of Pacific History 20 (1985), 66–83.
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saw Fiji as a competitive source for the manufacture of sugar for its refineries 
and markets in Australia and New Zealand. At the time, there were other millers 
in the colony but by 1926 CSR had purchased all the mills: a monopoly position 
it maintained until its departure in 1969.26
The story of exclusionary politics, however, has a longer build‑up to the colo‑
nisation of Fiji. First European settlers arrived in 1804 in the form of several 
escaped convicts from Botany Bay in the then British colony of New South Wales 
(Australia) and were later joined by shipwrecked sailors (i.e. beachcombers).27 
Missionaries followed, reaching Fiji in 1835 to “bring light to the souls of the 
dark, degraded, and miserable Feejeeans”.28 Fiji was then ruled by several chiefs 
in autonomous social groupings who were constantly at war with each other.29 
In 1855 Cakobau, the Chief of the little island of Bau located to the south east 
of the largest island of Viti Levu, won a major war with people from Rewa on 
the mainland through the assistance of King George of Tonga.30 Cakobau con‑
verted to Christianity and with the help of the European settlers tried forming 
a  government.31 The government failed, forcing Cakobau, with the encourage‑
ment of British settlers, to cede Fiji to Britain in 1874.32 
Fiji subsequently underwent three major critical junctures that set the course 
for the evolution of the exclusionary and extractive institutions.33 The first was 
the support of King George of Tonga and the subsequent arrival of White settlers 
with firearms who teamed up with the Chiefs from Bau to subdue their rivals 
from surrounding regions. This coalition tipped the balance of power towards 
Cakobau, who was the chief of Bau from 1853 to his death in 1883.34 
The second critical juncture was the arrival of Arthur Gordon, the first 
resident governor, to the colony in 1874. He remained governor until 1880.35 
Governor Gordon banned the alienation of land, introduced communal 
ownership, curtailed the recruitment of indigenous labour by the European 
26 Moynagh, Brown Or White…, 31.
27 Cf. John Burton. The Fiji of to‑day, (London, CH Kelly, 1910).
28 Deryck Scarr, Fiji: a short history (Sydney: George Allen and Urnwin, 1984), 13.
29 John Legge. Britain in Fiji, 1858–1880 (Chicago: Macmillan 1958), 62 and 116.
30 Legge. Britain in Fiji…, 12–13.
31 Peter France, The charter of the land: custom and colonization on Fiji (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), 94.
32 The reasons for failure are many including the inability to pay American debt, which 
originated from a fabrication by John Williams, the resident American consul, wherein goods 
worth $5,000 were allegedly stolen from his Nukulau compound after a fire caused by celebrations 
of 4th July 1869; the sum had escalated to a demand for $43,000 at the time of Williams’ death 
in 1860 (Scarr, 1984, 27). 
33 Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Kelemen. “The study of critical junctures: Theory, narrative, 
and counterfactuals in historical institutionalism”, World Politics, 59 (2007): 341–369. 
34 Scarr, Fiji: A Short History…, 51–64.
35 Cf. Legge, Britain in Fiji, 1858–1880 .
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planters, and introduced a village hierarchy with the chiefs at the apex as part 
of his instrument for indirect rule.36 Contrary to the contemporary practice 
in British colonies, the bulk of the land was placed under indigenous control 
through deliberate misreading of the Deed of Cession by the Governor.37 
Inalienability of land and communal tenure were devised by Governor Gordon 
and based on an anthropological theory of ‘unilinear evolutionary development’38 
wherein Fijian society was deemed to have reached a stage of development from 
savagery to civilisation where any deviation from these norms was due to “cultural 
degeneracy resulting from contact with the white race”.39 These impositions were 
in sharp contrast to the shift from collective to individualised land holdings 
of the enclosure movement in 18th Century England, which is credited with 
having provided opportunity for enterprise and constituted a force for beneficial 
economic change.40 The third critical juncture was the import of indentured 
Indian labourers: which filled the void of workers in the nascent sugar industry. 
The last of the above provided the cover for the struggle for power amongst 
indigenous Fijians and as such was the least important for the coup of 1987.
Stratification of Fijian society began with Governor Gordon’s strategy of 
indirect rule. The Governor established a council of traditional chiefs and intro‑
duced a uniform system of native administration comprising the village, district, 
and provincial salaried‑heads reporting to the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC). 
The stratification entrenched the power of the chiefs over their people and pre‑
‑colonial history elevated chiefs from the East above their peers from elsewhere. 
While the Council of Chiefs was set up by Governor Gordon as an advisory 
body, it cemented its position in society and national politics post‑independence 
through the three national constitutions.41 
Gordon’s governorship (legacy) of just six years lives on in contemporary Fiji. 
Gordon took a highly paternalistic stance towards the indigenous population,42 
assuming the position of a Fijian Chief sitting at the apex of society; believing 
36 Peter France. “The founding of an orthodoxy: Sir Arthur Gordon and the Doctrine of the 
Fijian Way of Life”, The Journal of the Polynesian Society, 77 (1968): 6–32.
37 Scarr, 1984, 85.
38 France, 1968, 28.
39 Ibidem, 27. 
40 David Landes. The wealth and poverty of nations: Why some are so rich and some so poor 
(WW Norton & Company, 1999), 214.
41 Governor Gordon made clear that the chiefs held their positions ‘at the pleasure of the 
Government’ and threatened to dissolve the council upon hearing that some of its members had 
arrived drunk to a meeting (Legge, 1958: 217). The Council was disbanded 138 years later by the 
Prime Minister and Fiji’s Military Commander, Frank Bainimarama, on 13th March 2012.
42 Some credit for the paternalism is due to John Bates Thurston, a planter who reached the 
island of Rotuma in 1865, acted as the British Council from 1867 to 1869, then the first colonial 
secretary, and finally as Governor from 1888 to his death in 1897 (Cf. Legge, 1958 and Scarr, 1984). 
Thurston empathised with the natives, lamented “the wrongs we (Whites) have committed in the 
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in divinely‑gifted and unparalleled understanding of Fijian society; and being 
bestowed with “the heart of a Fijian”.43 There was, additionally, an economic 
and practical motivation for indirect rule achieved through the elevation of the 
power of chiefs. The governor had to manage a large archipelago with £100,000 
advanced by Britain and to be paid back as soon as possible. The lack of funds 
to hire European officers forced the Governor to draw on the services of the chiefs 
in his administration.44
At the suspension of indenture in 1916, a total of 62,837 Indians had come 
to Fiji; of whom some 60 percent were induced, with cash grants and land 
made available for cultivation of sugarcane, to settle in the colony.45 The politi‑
cal rights of Indians in the colony, however, remained in question. The Colonial 
Office in London recognised them as permanent settlers but their rights to land 
and their place in politics remained to be resolved.46 While the Europeans had 
settled on alienated land and the CSR was gifted alienated land, Indians could 
only lease land from the indigenous population. Furthermore, they remained 
‘Indians’ while the indigenous population claimed to be ‘Fijian’: a dichotomy 
that remained in the official records of the nation until July 2010 when all citi‑
zens became known as “Fijians” and the indigenous as i‑taukei. While all ethnic 
groups gained citizenship at independence, the national constitution mandated 
that only the i‑taukei could own the in‑alienated (i.e. Native) land. Indo‑Fijians 
leased Native Land on terms ranging from 10 to 99 years, largely to grow sugar‑
cane. The above created a tenant‑landowner divide with parallel ethnic division 
with ramifications for rent extraction and ethnically divisive politics.
The Indian struggle for a greater share of the economic surplus from the sugar 
industry began with a strike by the labourers in Suva, the capital, in 1920. The 
colonial government responded by recruiting and mobilising indigenous Fijian 
and European constables against the strikers while a warship from New Zealand 
was moored off the coast: Narsey credits this incident as the beginning of ethnic 
antagonism in the colony.47 A further strike in 1921 by Indo‑Fijians over pay 
and working conditions in the major sugarcane growing regions to the west of 
the main island of Viti Levu, which lasted for six months, was broken by the 
name of Christianity, civilisation, and progress” and desisted land acquisition by the European 
settlers, telling Gordon that: “we (Whites) are, as a race, a race of robbers and spoilers” (Scarr, 83).
43 France, Peter. “The Founding of an Orthodoxy: Sir Arthur Gordon and the Doctrine of 
the Fijian Way of Life”. The Journal of the Polynesian Society, Volume 77, no. 1 (1968): 6–32, 
quote from p. 8.
44 Legge Britain in Fiji, 1858–1880…, 155.
45 Adrian Mayer Indians in Fiji (Great Britain Oxford University Press, 1963), 24–32.
46 Kenneth Gillion. The Fiji Indians: Challenge to European Dominance, 1920–1946 (Canberra, 
Australian National University Press, 1977), 4ff.
47 Wadan Narsey. “Monopoly capital, white racism and superprofits in Fiji: a case study of the 
CSR”. Journal of Pacific Studies, 5 (1979), 66–146.
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government through recruiting Fijian labour and deporting the (Indian) leader 
of the strikers. Another strike over pay and working conditions offered by CSR 
took place in 1960. These economic struggles were officially labelled “as ethnic 
political agitation by Indians”.48
The politics of ethnicity took centre stage as the Indian population increased 
and as Fiji approached independence. By the Census of 1946 the Indian popula‑
tion had reached 120,414 (equal to 46 percent of the total) in comparison to the 
indigenous population of 118,070 (45 percent of total); while those of European 
descent numbered 10,746 (4 percent).49 Carroll (1994) notes that it was then that 
the “Indigenes were oriented against Indians” while Norton (1990) reports 
that  Indo‑Fijians were “constructed” as an “immigrant race” who were alleged 
by the Europeans to be “threatening Indigenous paramountcy”, with Europeans 
portraying themselves as protectors of indigenous rights against the Indians.50 
On the eve of independence, the Indo‑Fijian population (as of the Census of 1966 
at 50.5 percent) had surpassed the indigenous population (at 42 percent) while 
the Caucasian population stood at 3.4 percent. 
The independence Constitution of 1970 mandated 52 seats in the House 
of Representatives and entrenched the rights of the indigenous population to 
land and native administration. The seats were allocated across the three ethnic 
groups – Indigenous Fijians, Indo‑Fijians, and ‘Others’; the last including 
the residual category and comprising a majority Caucasian or part‑Caucasian 
population. Of the total of 52 seats, 12 Communal and 10 Common Roll seats 
were allocated to both the indigenous Fijian and the Indo‑Fijian communities. 
The communal seats were reserved to candidates of the particular ethnicity, with 
voting also restricted to people registered as belonging to the particular ethnic 
group. As an example, only indigenous Fijians could contest the 12 communal 
seats allocated to this group and voting was restricted to indigenous Fijians. 
Indigenous‑Fijian Common Roll seats, in contrast, were reserved for indigenous 
Fijian candidates, but voting was on the basis of universal suffrage. General 
Electors were allocated 3 Communal seats and 5 Common Roll seats. Thus, the 
House of Representatives was to have 22 Indo‑Fijian members, 22 Indigenous 
Fijians members, and 8 members who registered as neither of the above ethnicities. 
And in terms of the ratio of seats in the House of Representatives to population, 
‘Others’ were over‑represented with a factor of 2.2; indigenous Fijians were at par; 
and Indo‑Fijians were below par at a ratio of 0.83. The government overthrown 
by the coup of 1987 was elected on the basis of the 1970 Constitution. The 
48 Ibidem, 68.
49 Population figures are from Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics Key Statistics, March 2008 (Fiji: 
Government Printer, Suva), 3.
50 Terrance Carroll. “Owners, immigrants and ethnic conflict in Fiji and Mauritius”, Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, 17 (1994): 301–324 (quote from p. 307); Robert Norton. Race and politics in Fiji 
(Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1990), 37–38.
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Constitution was abrogated by the military following the second coup in 1987 
and since then Fiji has had two further coups and two sets of constitutions, with 
another currently under design.51
Inter‑ethnic rivalry took place over access to land for growing sugarcane. 
By the turn of the Century, approximately 88 percent of the total land area was 
under ‘Native Title’, inalienable, and owned by 6,000 clans (mataqalis).52 Native 
land that is deemed surplus to the needs of the mataqali may only be leased. 
A statutory corporation, the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB), was created 
in 1940 as the sole authority to lease Native Land for agricultural, industrial, 
and residential uses. NLTB deducts 25 percent of the proceeds from rent of the 
land as fee, the chiefs of varying ranks collect another 30 percent, leaving the 
balance to be distributed amongst the rest of the members of the mataqali.53 The 
terms of the lease, including the level of rents, are set by the legislature. Fallow 
Native Land leased for sugarcane farming is developed by the lessee who, on 
expiry of the term of lease, can either vacate the property or renegotiate a further 
lease. The latter is not allowed if the land is legally ‘reserved’ for use by the 
indigenous population: an instrument used to induce entry of indigenous Fijians 
into sugarcane farming.54 Disputes over a fair distribution of the proceeds from 
sugar between the indigenous landowners and ‘Indians’ provides the settings for 
inter‑ethnic rivalry.55 
Sugar as the Instrument for Rent Extraction
Sugar has historically lent itself as an ideal industry for rent extraction. On the 
technology used, Landes notes that: 
It took a lot of work to grow sugar cane, cut it, crush it, and refine the juice: 
gang labour under a hot sky; dangerous, hurried round‑the‑clock pressing, 
boiling, and skimming before the crop spoiled. In the fields, men and women 
did the work of animals. No ploughs, few tools, everything by hand. The idea was 
to make work and keep the hands busy, because idleness invited trouble. In the 
sugar mill, the workers fed the stalks into rollers; the smallest inattention, catch 
a hand, a finger, and the rest would follow. The boilers had their own small hell. 
Stir carefully: a splash of syrup, and the pain was excruciating.56
51 William Sutherland, Beyond the Politics of Race…, 161–198.
52 Oscar Kurer. Land tenure and sugar production in Fiji: property rights and economic 
performance. Pacific Economic Bulletin, 16 (2001): 94–105.
53 Ward and Kingdon. Land, Custom, … ; pages 242–244.
54 Harold Brookfield, Frank Ellis, and Ralph Ward. Land, cane and coconuts: papers on the rural 
economy of Fiji, (Canberra: Australian National University), p. 56.
55 Cf. Kurer, opcit
56 Landes opcit, pages 116–117.
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In the colonisation of the Caribbean, African slaves were brought in to work 
the industry since white free labour would not do the work. The abuse of the slaves 
was condoned because the authorities then believed that the natives had souls but 
were not sure if the blacks did.57 With respect to treatment of workers brought 
under the indenture system, Fiji was similar. There is surprising consensus amongst 
researchers that indenture in Fiji was “harsh, oppressive and exploitative”.58 
It was harsh because of a monopoly miller having at its disposal a labour‑contract 
with penal sanctions; it was oppressive given the miller operated in a colony of 
“less than impartial judiciary, and a tenor in white society of contempt towards 
grimitya [i.e. indentured workers]”59; and, it was exploitative since the labourers 
“were looked upon as sugar‑producing machines”.60 A dominant foreign investor 
whose operation was critical to the solvency of the colony was lent the power 
to extract surplus from the labourers through the complicity of the colonial 
administration. 
Colonial Fiji provided the complete recipe for rent extraction. Wolf and 
Mintz note that the requirements for foreign investment in other environments 
included: (i) a technology capable of producing a surplus; (ii) ‘class stratifica‑
tion’ so as to provide differential access to factors of production and thus the 
opportunity for rent extraction; (iii) the existence of an international market 
for the product; (iv) opportunities for capital accumulation; and, (v) a politi‑
cal‑legal system conducive to each of the above, including in sanctioning and 
supporting rent extraction by the elite.61 Sugar in colonial Fiji met each of the 
above‑enumerated conditions. 
Means to Rent Extraction
Sugar production in Fiji, much like that of the XIX Century in the West Indies, 
relied on a ‘factory central model’ where small‑scale plantations, created through 
land gifted by the Crown, provided sugarcane to a single, centralised, large grin‑
ding mill.62 CSR at its inception had its own plantations but also relied on the sup‑
ply of sugarcane by European planters. Indentured workers were at first divided 
between the planters and CSR, but over time the planters withdrew as profits fell. 
57 Ibidem, p. 117.
58 David Munro “In the Wake of the Leonidas: reflections on Indo‑Fijian indenture 
historiography”. The Journal of Pacific Studies, Volume 28 (2005), pp. 93–117, quote from p. 102.
59 David Munro. “In the Wake of the Leonidas: Reflections on Indo‑Fijian Indenture Historiography”. 
The Journal of Pacific Studies Volume 28, no. 1 (2005): 93–117, quote from p. 96.
60 Gillion, Fiji’s Indian Migrants…, 128.
61 Eric Wolf and Sidney Mintz. “Haciendas and Plantations in Middle America and the Antilles”. 
Social and Economic Studies 6, no. 3 (1957): 380–412.
62 Mintz, S.W. “The Culture History of a Puerto Rican Sugar Cane Plantation: 1876–1949”. The 
Hispanic American Historical Review 33, no. 2 (1953): 224–51.
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As indenture was being phased out, CSR began settling time‑expired labourers 
on small plots of land around their mills. This process gave rise to the smallholder 
sugarcane growing sector that, at its peak in the early 1990s, had 21,000 families 
engaged in farm production.63
Rent extraction by CSR took place from the moment the labourers arrived 
on the shores of Fiji. Wages paid to the indentured workers were less than what 
would have been the case in a competitive market. What constitutes a competitive 
market is debatable, thus two separate shadow wages – namely, those the workers 
were earning prior to their departure from India and the wages of native labourers 
in Fiji – are used. On the first, real (inflation adjusted) wages for indentured 
labourers in Fiji were lower than in India while the hours of work and the level 
of effort expended were higher. Andrews and Pearson, for example, report the 
cases of several workers whose earnings in terms of purchases of food in Fiji 
fell short of what they received in India.64 Second, while the indentured workers 
were paid one shilling per day, labourers at the CSR operated wharf in Lautoka 
as of 1916 were paid twice the amount, which was raised to three shillings per 
day following a strike.65 Additionally, overtasking (meaning allocation of tasks 
above that deemed possible by an adult in six hours) and payment of wages below 
the agreed minimum was common.66 
The creation of the smallholder sector was hailed by CSR as a success.67 
Initially, the company subdivided its plantations into small blocks and sold the 
rights to grow sugarcane to time‑expired indentured workers but under highly 
restrictive lease conditions. The plots provided by CSR ranged from 2.5 to 5 acres 
and came with a regimented program of sugarcane cultivation – one plot under 
plant cane, another with ratoon cane, a third under preparation, and the fourth 
left fallow, with the proviso that “the tenancy would be terminated if the tenant 
used the land in a manner not approved by CSR”.68 Many growers claimed 
that this arrangement was no different to indenture.69 The shift to smallholder 
sugarcane farming was deliberate on the part of CSR and designed to achieve 
four specific objectives; namely: (i) to provide a sustained source of labour for the 
company; (ii) to maximise the output of sugarcane from the land; (iii) to diversify 
the political risk of taxation of rents by the colonial government; and, (iv) 
to minimise the risks of farming, including the insecurity of land tenure and the 
63 Paresh Narayan and Biman Prasad. “Economic Importance of the Sugar Industry for Fiji”. 
Review of Urban & Regional Development Studies 17, no. 2 (2005): 104–14.
64 Charles Andrews and William Pearson. “Indentured Labour in Fiji: An Independent Enquiry”. 
(Suva, Fiji: 1916), p. XI.
65 Kenneth Hince “Man with a mission: Edward Sanday”. Pacific Island Monthly (1987), 40–45.
66 Cf. Moynagh, 1981; Narsey, 1979; Knapman, 1987.
67 CSR. Sugar in Fiji, (Sydney: Colonial Sugar Refining Company), 3, passim.
68 Narsey, “Monopoly Capital, …”, 108.
69 Andrews and Pearson, “Indentured Labour in Fiji: …”. (Suva, Fiji: 1916), VII.
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impacts of adverse weather including droughts and cyclones. Each of the above is 
explained in some detail next. 
The small size of the farms and their location close to the sugar mills 
meant that the settled families could meet all of their labour needs and were 
in a position to supply excess labour to the mills. CSR limited the use of its 
transportation infrastructure to sugarcane, thus curtailing options for other 
income‑generating activities.70 The highly seasonal nature of demand for work‑
ers for the cultivation, harvesting, and milling of sugarcane made the presence 
of surplus workers within the vicinity of the mills critical to the profitability 
of CSR. On (ii), the small size of the plots made mechanisation uneconomic, 
thus labour‑intensive forms of cultivation remained dominant. In sharp con‑
trast to Queensland and Mauritius, the smallholders to this day use animal 
power and all sugarcane is harvested manually, with every area of land used 
to grow the crop. On (iii), nearly a quarter of the population is either directly 
or indirectly dependent on sugar, making the industry of considerable political 
importance.71 As an example, attempts to raise taxes on CSR proved difficult 
given the chorus of support the company drew each time a policy was seen as 
harming the industry.72 Finally, and in sharp contrast to the consolidation of 
farms and the purchase of haciendas by large corporations in Puerto Rico, the 
number of smallholders grew over time.73
Why did the indentured workers accept working conditions worse than what 
prevailed in India and outside of the sugar industry? The answer lies in agency 
and information problems. First, over 80 percent of indentured labourers 
were recruited under “some deceit” and “indenture [was] neither a free nor an 
intelligent contract”.74 Second, the penal clauses of indenture (which were not 
explained to the labourers at recruitment) amounted to bondage from which 
the labourers were unable to escape, as the cost of escape was prohibitive and the 
social support mechanisms to seek redress absent. Tinker describes indenture 
as ‘a new system of slavery’, differing from the old (i.e. chattel slavery) only 
in terms of its temporariness.75 Third, indenture marooned the labourers in Fiji 
since they were considered as ‘out castes’ in India and robbed of their assets on 
return.76 The only exit was suicide and amongst indentured workers the rate of 
suicide was six times that of free Indian migrants to the colony and 15 times 
70 Moynagh. Brown or white…, 55–58, 124–130.
71 Narayan and Prasad. “Economic importance of the sugar industry for Fiji” Review of Urban 
& Regional Development Studies, 17, 104–114.
72 Moynagh. Brown or white…, 160.
73 Ibidem, 123.
74 Andrews and Pearson. “Indentured labour in Fiji …”, 5, 18.
75 Tinker (1974), pp 432.
76 Sanadhya, 1991, p. 5.
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that of their originating province in India.77 Fourth, the process of indenture 
debased the labourers from their communities, making it difficult for them 
to organise a unified response to CSR. Fifth, the dependence of the labourers 
on cash for food purchased from CSR stores and them being quarantined from 
the indigenous population by the policies of the colonial administration left 
them in the claws of the predator (CSR). The rations provided by CSR cost 
81 percent of adult male average earnings.78 These experiences of indentured 
workers in Fiji have close parallels to the “menacing” socio‑political conditions 
for labourers (agregados) in Puerto Rican sugar cane plantations where the 
“threat of losing one’s house, one’s job, one’s credit at the company store, hung 
over everyone”.79 Finally, a belief in karma (fatalism) may have encouraged 
submissiveness. 
Rent extraction from indentured labourers also took place via differential 
access to public services. Public service provisions, including access to education 
and healthcare, were captured by the elite, comprising the resident European and 
indigenous populations. Per child government expenditure on schools for children 
aged from 5 to 14 years in 1928, as an example, was £8 pounds for Europeans, 
12 shillings for indigenous Fijians, and 5 shillings for Indo‑Fijians. Thus, while 
91.5 percent and 80 percent of European and indigenous Fijian children in the 
5 to 14 year age cohort were in school, respectively, the corresponding figure for 
Indo‑Fijians was 17.5 percent.80 There is consensus amongst researchers that the 
beneficiaries from the colonial sugar industry included the government, foreign 
capitalists via CSR, landowners, and merchants.81 
Politics of Rent Extraction
The majority of smallholders are Indo‑Fijians growing sugarcane on native 
land.82 The smallholders comprise a large constituency that aspiring political 
leaders have drawn upon. Access to land for growing sugarcane has remained 
a major issue of contention between the Indo‑Fijians and indigenous Fijians.83 
And the tussle for rents arising from the sugar industry takes place in three distinct 
tiers. The top most tier comprises of the monopoly miller versus the multiple 
77 Bruce Knapman. Fiji’s economic history, 1874–1939: Studies of capitalist colonial development 
(Canberra: Australian National University, 1987), p. 13. 
78 Knapman, 1987; p. 51
79 Mintz, 1953: p. 249. 
80 Gillion, 1977; p. 122
81 Cf. Andrews and Pearson (1916), Narsey (1979), Moynagh (1981) Knapman (1985).
82 Narayan and Prasad, 1985; 3. 
83 Padma Lal and Mahendra Reddy, “Old wine in a new bottle? Proposed sugar industry 
restructuring and land conflict in Fiji”, Pacific Economic Bulletin 18 (2003), 79–99.
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growers; the second tier comprises the NLTB versus the growers; and the third 
tier constitutes the chiefs versus the rest in the indigenous community. As noted 
earlier, the bulk of rental payments accrued to indigenous chiefs and the NLTB. 
While CSR departed in 1969 and Fiji gained independence in 1970, the politics 
of rent extraction between the indigenous landowners and the descendants of 
the indentured labourers remains. The ethnic parallel between tenants and 
landowners whereby the conditions for leasing of land are debated and agreed 
to in the national parliament has institutionalised rent‑seeking and centralised 
the politics of race. Furthermore, sugarcane is grown and milled in the north 
western half of the two main islands while the capital is located in the south east 
of the main island, providing a geographic (East‑West) divide on the competition 
for sugar rents as well. 
Conclusion
Colonialism was about Commerce, Civilisation, and Christianity.84 While this 
comment was observed for the continent of Africa, it applied equally well to the 
Fiji Islands located in the South West Pacific. The complex interactions between 
culture, economy, and social history emanating from the production of sugar 
in distant places under capitalism and with the support of slavery and indentured 
workers has been studied in detail in the Caribbean and Puerto Rico.85 Many of 
these observations translate to Fiji. I have argued that the coups in contemporary 
Fiji and the ethnic strife the nation has experienced the past Century are the 
products of extractive economic and exclusionary political institutions implanted 
at colonisation. The introduction of Indian indentured labour helped with rent 
extraction and lent the cover for the coups as an inter‑ethnic struggle when the 
reality was a struggle amongst chiefs, across tribes, and between the communities 
from east and west of the mainland of Vitilevu. 
The case study of profits and power from indentured workers brought to Fiji 
illustrates how a monopoly miller of sugarcane with complicity of the colonial 
administration was able to extract economic surplus and ship this abroad in the 
form of profits. CSR, in short, used (abused) its might in the colonial economy 
and its monopoly position in the sugar industry to extract surplus from owners of 
land and labour. And with the colonial administration, it left behind institutions 
that created ethnic divisions in society that have had a lasting detrimental impact 
on the economy and national politics. Rent extraction and elitist politics has 
undermined political and economic freedom in postcolonial Fiji. 
84 Cf. Sultan Barakat, After the conflict: Reconstruction and development in the aftermath of war 
(London: IB Tauris, 2005).
85 Cf. Sidney Mintz, Sweetness and Power: The place of sugar in world history (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1986). 
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The political economy of indirect rule put in place at colonisation created 
a polity that maintained its hegemony and which impeded the development of 
inclusive (egalitarian) institutions and thus the efficient adjustment of the legal 
system, a feature of ‘common law’ jurisdictions, to the changing demands of the 
economy with the passage of time.86 Institutions put in place to protect and pro‑
mote the welfare of the privileged have resulted in multiple coups in postcolonial 
Fiji. The coups have been the outcome of a schism created by an electoral system 
grounded in universal, albeit limited, suffrage conflicting with rent‑extraction 
by an elite that has maintained this privilege since colonisation. 
Fiji’s case is not unique. There is a large and growing literature on the 
contribution of property rights to individual freedom and national prosperity.87 
Here, I have used a single case study to provide support to the view that exclusionary 
political and extractive economic institutions seeded at colonisation have led 
to political strife and economic plight in a nation a century later. A single study 
cannot prove a general point; but this study adds to the body of cross‑country 
studies showing that inequality and coloniser incentives for settlement explain 
lasting divergences in economic prosperity across nations. 
Satish Chand
Socio‑Political Consequences of Forced Migration: The Case of Indian Indentured 
Workers to Fiji
Summary
During the period of 1879 to 1916, 60 thousand Indian indentured workers were 
shipped from India to Fiji to supply labour to a nascent sugar industry. The system of 
indenture bonded the workers for a minimum of 5 years to their employer, the Colonial 
Sugar Refining Company of Australia (CSR). The economic reality of indenture, however, 
was that the majority of the workers were stranded in Fiji for generations. CSR departed 
in 1969 and Britain as the colonial power left a year later, leaving behind a deeply divided 
polity with ethnicity and race at the centre of political struggle. Since its independence 
in 1970 Fiji has had four military coup d’états and in the process transformed itself from 
being a nation of immigrants to one of emigrants. Economic decline and poverty, in the 
meantime, accelerated: the proportion of the population with income below the national 
poverty line increased from one in eight in 1977 to one in four by 1990 and one in three 
by 2002. It is, on all indications, still rising. Here I narrate the political and socio‑politico‑
‑economic consequences of indenture to Fiji. 
86 See Ross Levine, Law, endowments, and property rights (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau 
of Economic Research, 2005), 3 passim. 
87 Cf. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson Why nations fail (London: Profile Books, 2012).
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